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le n c a
Defending Honor and Beyond: Reconsidering the Relationship between Seemingly Futile 
Defense and Permissible Harming 
In Helen Frowe's book, Defensive Killing, she argues that some cases of seemingly futile self- 
defense are actually instances of justifiable defense of the victim's honor. This paper explores 
Frowe's claim, first by isolating the central cases and then by examining her rejection of punitive 
reasons. From there, the paper examines Frowe's understanding of "defense of honor," 
ultimately suggesting that Frowe's conception is best construed as action that has expressive, but 
not defensive, value. From there, I turn to two more general puzzles. First, what if the defender 
mistakenly believes that she can successfully defend and acts for that reason, but the reason that 
actually supports her action is not one she is acting in light of? And, second, how ought we to 
understand the interests of an aggressor who has forfeited his rights? 
Helen Frowe, Defensive Killing, self-defense, honor, necessity 
1 
*This is the draft that was submitted to the Journal of Moral Philosophy. For copyright reasons,
I cannot post the final version, accepted on March 3, 2017. Some corrections and amendments 
were made to the discussion that follows. For a final version, please refer to the journal. 
Defending Honor and Beyond: Reconsidering the Relationship between Seemingly Futile 
Defense and Permissible Harming 
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan* 
There is an intuitive sense that even when, as the Star-Trek villains “The Borg” would 
say, “Resistance is futile,” defensive force remains permissible. A woman, unable to prevent a 
rape, does not seem to wrong her attacker by breaking his wrist. The Warsaw ghetto uprising 
seems honorable, even though the “defenders” knew their resistance was in vain. And, as 
Danny Statman notes, we cheer for John Wayne cowboy movies where, even when they are 
surrounded, we think the heroes do right by taking their last stand.1 
Should we conclude that defensive force need not be necessary? This would be too 
quick. Whereas these futile defenses seem permissible, other acts of unnecessary defense do not. 
May I shoot a culpable aggressor when I can safely escape? It seems that I would act 
impermissibly in so doing. 
These cases are distinct, despite the fact that in both instances, defensive force is in some 
sense unnecessary. In the first, the defensive force appears ineffective (and thereby unnecessary 
because it is not sufficient to stop the attack), whereas, in the second, the defensive force would 
be sufficient but remains unnecessary to prevent harm to the victim. 
In her book, Helen Frowe claims that some acts of ineffective defense are not ineffective 
after all. Rather, some force may be proportionate to defending the victim’s honor. She is further 
* I thank the participants at the Workshop on Helen Frowe’s Defensive Killing and Seth Lazar’s Sparing Civilians as
well as the participants at the Harvard Law and Philosophy Colloquium for the probing criticisms and insightful
suggestions. Frances Kamm and Alec Walen provided invaluable feedback on this manuscript.
1 Daniel Statman, ‘On the Success Condition for Legitimate Self-Defense’, Ethics 118 (2009), pp. 659-686. 
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willing to extend this defense of honor to cases of the second type, allowing some harm to 
attackers even when victims can safely retreat. 
In this paper, I begin by setting forth the central case of futile defense and eliminating 
distracting cases that misunderstand the nature and justification of self-defense. I then consider 
one justification for harming in futile defense cases that Frowe rejects: punitive reasons.  I argue 
that punitive reasons can justify harming the attacker in futile defense cases and show that 
Frowe’s deferred harming objection to punitive reasons fails. From there, I consider Frowe’s 
claim that some force is justified because the victim is defending her honor. I find this claim to 
be undertheorized and thus address different conceptions and claims about honor that may be at 
work. 
After suggesting that Frowe’s conception of “defending honor” is best construed as 
action that has expressive, but not defensive, value, I turn to two more general puzzles implicated 
by these unnecessary defense cases. The first is the problem of mismatch. What if the defender 
mistakenly believes that she can successfully defend and acts for that reason, but the reason that 
actually supports her action is not one she is acting in light of? That is, may the defender avail 
herself of punitive reasons if what she aims to do is defend herself? The second puzzle is how to 
understand the interests of an aggressor who has forfeited his rights. Frowe seems to believe that 
these interests may be asserted by the aggressor in a lesser-evils calculation. In contrast, I 
maintain that aggressors who have forfeited rights cannot assert the interests that were protected 
by those rights. 
I. Futile Defense Cases:  The Central Case and Question
Within the category of futile defense cases, it is important to put one class of cases to the 
side at the outset. As Frowe rightly observes (111) and as was previously noted by David 
Rodin,2 one need not do any fancy footwork to explain why Alice, who is threatened to be raped 
by five men, may kill three, even though she will still be raped. Rights are relational.  Alice gets 
to prevent Bob from raping her, even if Carl still will. Hence, some of the cases suggested by 
Statman do not require a resort to defending honor to resolve them. 
2 David Rodin, ‘Justifying Harm’, Ethics 122 (2011), pp. 74-110, p.92; see also F.M. Kamm, ‘Self-Defense, Resistance 
and Suicide: The Taliban Women’, in Helen Frowe and Gerald Lang (eds.), How We Fight: Ethics in War (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 75-86. 
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Because multiple attacker cases, where force is not futile against specific rights 
violations, contaminate our intuitions about some instances of unnecessary force, let us focus on 
one of Frowe’s cases (originally imagined by Joanna Mary Firth and Jonathan Quong3) that 
offers a pure example of futile defense. 
Rape: Eric is in the midst of culpably raping Fran. Eric is much bigger and stronger 
than Fran, and consequently there is nothing she can do to stop him from 
continuing to rape her. While being raped, Fran threatens to break Eric’s wrist, 
though this will do nothing to stop the rape from occurring. The only way Eric 
can stop Fran from breaking his wrist is to quickly break her wrist first. (99). 
One immediate question is whether Fran believes that her action will stop the attack. I 
will return to this issue later. For now, let us proceed on Frowe’s assumption that Fran knows 
that breaking Eric’s wrist cannot prevent the rape. That is, we begin with the assumption that 
Fran does not think there is even the slightest chance that she can be successful, and thus, her 
action is not being done with the intention of defending herself against the sexual assault. 
II. Punitive reasons
The question at hand is whether Fran is permitted to break Eric’s wrist, particularly given 
the concern that if she is not so permitted, Eric might have the right to fight back and stop her. I 
think it is extremely plausible that punitive reasons do exist that support Fran’s actions and that 
Frowe has not successfully ruled such reasons out of consideration. 
Frowe considers but dismisses what she calls “punitive reasons,” including desert (106) 
and deterrence (107). "But although punishment is the most obvious candidate for justification 
for harming Eric, it fails to provide a satisfactory justification for inflicting harm in the cases 
under discussion." (107). 
She finds two objections to punitive reasons accounts to be surmountable. She believes 
the concern that private individuals can’t usually punish is not inherently problematic; after all, 
the aggressor is liable to the harm, and any punishment received by aggressor at the hands of the 
3 Joanna Mary Firth and Jonathan Quong, ‘Necessity, Moral Liability, and Defensive Harm’, Law and Philosophy 31 
(2012), pp. 673-701. 
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defender can be deducted from the state’s ultimate imposition of sentence.4 (107). Second, one 
may worry that private citizens will get the wrong guy, but during the rape itself, Fran isn’t likely 
to make a mistake about her attacker. According to Frowe, this too is a surmountable objection. 
(107). 
Frowe's central objection is that punitive reasons don’t seem to rule out "deferred 
harming." Why can't Fran break Eric's wrist the next day? "Liability to punishment is triggered 
by engaging in wrongdoing, but persists once the wrongdoing has ceased." (107). How can the 
reason that applies to letting the state be the one to punish attackers "somehow get stronger once 
the attack has ended[?] But it's hard to see why this would be the case--unlike defensive action, 
there's typically no urgency about punitive measures." (108) Given that we would not let her 
punish him later (we would insist that the state do it), why let her punish him now? It seems like 
indulging vigilante justice. 
Frowe then just concludes: “If we do not think that Murderer and Eric are liable to suffer 
deferred harm at the hands of their victims, we will need to reject punishment as the source of a 
liability to non-defensive harm.” (109) Either Frowe is rejecting that punitive reasons exist or 
she is rejecting that they are available to Fran. I find neither claim plausible. 
To deny that punitive reasons exist is to reject that punitive reasons are generated during 
the rape. This can’t be true. Consider first desert. Eric, by virtue of his culpable wrongdoing, 
deserves to be punished. If so, then this reason exists at the time of the rape. What about 
deterrence? The case is both stronger and weaker. Deterrence is empirically contingent and thus 
the reason may not obtain at all.5 The reason will exist when it deters and won’t when it doesn’t. 
In that sense the case is weaker. But when the reason does exist, there is no doubt that it exists 
during the rape itself. Hence, even if you think that “punishment” requires the state, deterring 
aggression clearly does not. 
The fact that these reasons do exist does create the puzzle of deferred harming. So, how 
might we account for the fact that Fran can’t punish Eric later? To my mind, the best account 
would be one that draws on the state’s role (and possible monopoly) on punishment. What Fran 
does wrong—if she acts wrongfully at all—is to take over the state’s role, but her action does not 
4 It is an open question in criminal law theory whether such a deduction should occur, see Douglas N. Husak, 
‘Already Punished Enough?’ Philosophical Topics 18 (1990), pp. 79-99; see also Ferzan, ‘Desert and Defense’. 
5 See also Statman, ‘On the Success Condition for Legitimate Self-Defense’, pp. 659-686. 
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violate Eric’s rights. Moreover, there is certainly room for a theory of the state that holds that an 
individual, while being attacked by a wrongdoer and unprotected by the state—is simply not 
governed by the social contract to leave punishment to the state. After all, at that moment, there 
is not a functioning state that is holding up its end of the bargain by protecting her.6 Indeed, I 
have argued that the reason why we applaud vigilantes in popular culture where the hero is 
provoked (my favorite is Russell Crowe’s killing of Joaquin Phoenix in Gladiator) is because 
these are cases where not only does the bad guy have a lot of desert long overdue but also the 
state has wholly failed to give the bad guy what he deserves (in Gladiator, the bad guy is the 
state).7 We may thus think that in the absence of a state the protects her right now, Fran may be 
permitted to punish Eric.8 
We may think that after Rape, Fran has rule of law reasons to defer to the state. If she 
went and broke his wrist the next week, then, it isn’t that the desert reason operates less strongly 
– it doesn’t. But the fear that there will be downstream effects that others might retaliate in
mistaken situations, combined with a general belief that the state is just, operate to require Fran 
to stay her hand. That said, if she breaks his wrist, I still think he fully deserves it. 
Now, perhaps Frowe’s quick conclusion was meant to say not that these reasons do not 
exist but that they are never available to Fran. Fran is not entitled to punish. Given that Frowe 
explicitly rejects the argument that “we don’t typically allow private individuals to dish out 
punishment” (107), just two pages prior, such a move is not supported by the text. More 
importantly, the question of whether Fran wrongs Eric by giving him what he deserves is simply 
a different question from whether Fran violates the social contract by not ceding authority to the 
state. 
The more difficult question, and one to which I will return in a bit, is what intention Fran 
must have while harming Eric. That is, a better argument Frowe could make against access to 
punitive reasons is that an action cannot be considered punitive unless the harm is inflicted with 
6 I won’t pretend that this argument is not a tough row to hoe. But it doesn’t strike me as wildly implausible. 
7 Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, ‘Provocateurs’, Criminal Law and Philosophy 7 (2013), pp. 597-622. 
8 Alternatively, we might think that at the very least, Fran is excused in violating the social contract because it 
would be too hard a choice to ask her to decline to punish during the course of the crime. As Frowe noted in 
conversation, an excuse account would yield that punitive reasons do not justify harming Eric, and it is an account 
of justification that Frowe is seeking. Still, such an account would yield that Fran does not wrong Eric, and thus, 
Eric does not have the right to counter-defense, which, I take it, is the most significant worry about finding Fran’s 
action unjustifiable. 
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the intention to punish. There is thus a possibility of a mismatch between Fran’s reasons for 




Frowe argues that defending honor is a better explanation for our intuitions that futile 
defensive actions are permissible. They are not futile after all! Fran is successfully defending 
her honor. In articulating how this might be so, she endorses Statman’s claim that “in the eyes of 
the aggressor, we are just items to be used, mere objects.” (109)9 And, she approvingly cites 
Barbara Herman’s formulation that one may defend against an aggressor because he “would use 
me (take my life) for his purposes.” (110)10 
From here Frowe does a bit of synthesis and extrapolation, maintaining this sort of 
argument only applies to “culpable aggressors” who “demonstrate some inappropriate lack of 
regard” for the victim. (110). Understanding what is at stake in the attack is essential to 
determining what sort of response is proportionate. Here, Frowe concurs with Statman’s 
assessment that the attack on honor is correlated with the gravity of the underlying threat: 
The gravity of the threat to honour is likely to increase as the seriousness of the primary 
threat increases because a threat to honour is about the wrongness of thinking that one 
may do this sort of thing to one’s victim. The worse that one is treating one’s victim in 
terms of the primary threat, the more one denies her status as a person deserving of a 
certain sort of consideration. Thinking that you are the sort of thing that I can slap 
because I feel like slapping you is not as significant a threat to your honour as thinking 
that you are the sort of thing I can rape or kill or seriously assault because I feel like 
raping, killing, or seriously assaulting you. (112). 
Frowe concludes that threats to honor are not as bad as the primary threats. Even when 
the primary threat is rape or killing, she argues, contra Statman, that the corresponding threat to 
9 Citing Statman, ‘On the Success Condition for Legitimate Self-Defense’, p. 669. 
10 Barbara Herman, ‘Murder and Mayhem’ in The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1993), p. 129. 
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honor only justifies imposition of “moderate harm like a broken wrist or arm.” (112-13).11 More 
force would not be proportionate, Frowe asserts, because the defensive harm is conveying one’s 
assertion that one will not be passive and complicit and that one is a person worthy of better 
treatment. (113). Moreover, defending honor comes with its own success, as it is in the trying 
that one reasserts one’s dignity. (114). 
Frowe is cognizant of the fact that she must offer a limit to defending honor, lest the 
“deferred harming” objection hoist her on her own petard. She suggests that to the extent that 
the threat to honor supervenes on the primary harm, then the threat to honor is over when the 
primary threat is over. (113). The defender might seek restoration of honor but she cannot 
prevent the harm done. (114). 
Frowe then considers further extensions of defending honor to instances in which force is 
unnecessary because lesser means are available to the defender: 
Lucky Escape: Murderer is shooting at Victim to try to kill him because he dislikes 
Victim. He chases Victim to the edge of a cliff. Unbeknownst to 
Murderer, Victim has both a gun and a parachute. He can thus save his 
own life by either (a) jumping to safety, using no force against Murderer, 
or (b) shooting and killing Murderer. 
Because Frowe takes necessity to be an external restriction on the use of permissible self- 
defense, she claims that Murderer is liable to defensive force so he cannot kill the Victim in 
counter-defense, but Victim still acts impermissibly in shooting him. (117). Hence, according to 
Frowe, even if culpable aggressors have forfeited their rights, it is still not all-things-considered 
permissible to kill them unnecessarily. (117).12 
Despite the fact that Murderer is not liable to being killed, Frowe maintains that “some 
harm inflicted on Murderer can be necessary as a means of Victim’s defending his honour.” 
(117) “Since Murderer poses a lethal threat, it will be proportionate for Victim to inflict quite
significant harm to defend his honour, and thus a substantial component of the lethal harm 
Victim inflicts will satisfy the necessity constraint.” (117). Because Murderer is liable to some 
11 As noted by Frowe, it seems likely that Statman’s intuitions were tainted by the multiple aggressor cases. It 
seems plain that one may kill one potential rapist even if another person will rape one. But Statman saw these 
cases as futile defense cases and thus reached the conclusion that one may kill to protect one’s honor. 
12 Accord Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, ‘Forfeiture and Self-Defense’, in Christian Coons and Michael Weber (eds.), The 
Ethics of Self-Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
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successful harm by Victim’s defending his honor, Murderer is entitled to use force only to the 
extent that Victim’s force is disproportionate to the honor defense. 
B. Assessing Honor
I am sympathetic to the idea that we may use a mild amount of force to defend our honor 
and dignity. That said, I find Frowe’s account to be problematic and undertheorized in several 
respects. Admittedly, Frowe’s book seeks to accomplish quite a bit in a short number of pages, 
but before one signs onto the “Hooray for Fran and her honor!” account of our intuitions, let me 
set forth some cautionary questions and see if we can tease out different notions of honor and 
defending honor that may be at play. 
1. What does it mean to threaten honor?
In Rape, there are a two distinct factors that inform our view that Fran is defending her 
honor and Frowe focuses on both of them. One factor is that rape entails using another person as 
a means. The second is that Eric is culpable. 
It does not seem that “using” is necessary to constitute an attack on honor if attacking 
honor is to be understood as manifesting a disrespectful attitude. Consider a purposeful 
eliminative killing. What if a woman, jealous that her boyfriend has dumped her for another, 
shoots her competitor dead in order to be with the man of her dreams? The killing here is clearly 
eliminative, not opportunistic. She does not want to disrespect this woman; she just wants this 
other woman to go away. Are eliminative killings threats to honor? Frowe states: 
Thinking that you are the sort of thing that I can slap because I feel like slapping you is 
not as significant a threat to your honour as thinking that you are the sort of thing I can 
rape or kill or seriously assault because I feel like raping, killing, or seriously assaulting 
you. (112). 
This argument seems to presuppose that the aggressor is harming the victim as a means to 
some end if only the end of feeling like deriving pleasure from harming the victim. However, 
Frowe also seems to think that attacks on honor are actions that reveal culpable disregard for 
others, that is, showing insufficient concern for others’ interests. In that case, honor is attacked 
whenever the victim is intentionally harmed. 
9 
From here, it seems that we might be inclined to find that lesser culpability also counts, 
including recklessness. What if I speed home to catch the most recent episode of my favorite 
soap opera, thus imposing a risk on you as a pedestrian? If you can’t stop me from 
unintentionally, but recklessly, rendering you quadriplegic, can you break my wrist and say, 
“You can run me over, but you can’t take my honor!”? Are attacks on honor just culpability by 
another name?13 
Larry Alexander and I have argued that culpability is manifesting insufficient concern for 
another’s interests.14 It seems that the idea that Frowe is after here is not opportunistic use but 
rather the manifestation of an attitude that the victim does not count. It is that disrespect to 
which the victim is responding. 
2. What is the relationship between an attack on honor and the primary harm?
To this point, we might think that the sort of disrespect embodied in an attack need not 
entail using a person and includes culpable attacks on others. One might then wonder whether 
culpable attacks, even if they don’t cause harm themselves, still constitute attacks on honor such 
that one may harm culpable attempters. Statman suggests that when honor stands alone, it will 
justify some use of force, just not the use of deadly force that he took to be proportionate when 
honor was parasitic on a primary harm. An implication of Frowe’s claim that one can defend 
honor in Lucky Escape is that honor is itself sufficient for some defensive force. Indeed, at one 
point, she claims the difference between inchoate and choate crimes is the difference between 
just insulting your honor and insulting your honor and harming you. But that would mean that if 
I intend to kill Helen, point a gun at her, and she knows the gun is unloaded (but I do not), she is 
permitted to harm me to prevent me from pulling the trigger so that she might defend her honor. 
Do I really succeed in dishonoring her if I fail in my attempt? I reveal that I am culpable and do 
13 Frances Kamm argues that “mere resistance” is permissible in response to unjust attacks, even when the 
aggressor is not culpable. Kamm, ‘Self-Defense, Resistance and Suicide: The Taliban Women’, n. 4 (deluded child 
with gun is liable to defensive action because attack is unjust and individuals may engage in “mere resistance” 
against unjust acts). Kamm takes there to be value in responding to wrongdoing. Still, where the aggressor is not 
culpably manifesting disrespect, it is harder to get a handle on why nonculpable aggressors (such as a child who 
believes a gun is a toy) may be harmed just for “standing up to unjust acts,” in instances where the harm serves 
neither defensive nor punishment goals. Because responding to Kamm’s view, which Frowe does not discuss, 
would take us too far afield, I will focus only on the view of honor that Frowe appears to be endorsing. 
14 Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 23-68. 
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not respect her but is she truly permitted to break my wrist just to stop me from pulling the 
trigger of an unloaded gun which will reveal that I disrespect her?  As a matter of reporting one’s 
intuitions, I will admit that I find it far less plausible that one is entitled to use force to defend 
one’s honor when one knows that no harm is at issue. 
On the other hand, tying honor to the primary harm seems to create the opposite problem 
which is whether the attack on honor can be thwarted if the primary harm is not. Consider the 
claim by John Gardner and Stephen Shute that the wrong of rape just is the opportunistic use.15 
Admittedly, there is something decidedly odd about disregarding the harms inherent in rape as 
mere epiphenomena.16 Still, if the most abhorrent thing about rape is the use of a person as a 
means and that cannot be stopped, in what sense is honor truly being defended? 
3. Honor and expressive value
Maybe we should not think of “defending honor” as being the same sort of action as other 
sorts of defensive force. That is, rather than thinking that the harming of the aggressor somehow 
averts a threat to honor in the way that we think physical harms avert physical threats, perhaps 
defending honor is more expressive than defensive. I think Frowe equivocates a bit on her 
conception. Frowe does seem to view the conduct as “defending honor,” as she mentions force 
that is “proportionate to averting the threat to honor” (112) and “defend[ing] herself against a 
threat to her honour.” (114) These phrases indicate that the conduct will avert the harm. 
However, other passages point toward a more expressive view: 
When we think about what it is that such harms try to convey—a refusal to be passive, a 
refusal to be complicit, a means of asserting oneself as a person worthy of better 
treatment—it seems that even in the face of a serious threat to one’s honor, such as that 
present during rape inflicting a moderate harm upon one’s attacker (a broken limb, for 
example) would suffice to manifest such an attitude which is what constitutes the defense 
of one’s honour. (113) 
15 John Gardner and Stephen Shute, ‘The Wrongness of Rape’, in Jeremy Horder, (ed.), Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence, Fourth Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 193-217. 
16 See Victor Tadros, ‘The Distinctiveness of Domestic Abuse: A Freedom Based Account’ Louisiana Law Review 65 
(2005), pp. 989-1014. 
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In this sense, “fighting back” has intrinsic expressive value. It therefore comes with its 
own success condition, as merely by fighting back one is (re)asserting one’s worth. 
This idea is deeply entrenched. We have a number of norms that take it to be valuable to 
fight in the face of futility. In the face of the opposing team’s inevitable victory, every parent 
teaches her child to play the game out. You don’t quit, give up, throw in the towel, but instead, 
you play your best even if the face of certain defeat. And, we think that this strength of will and 
determination are valuable character traits. This may be the same ethos that supports thoughts 
such that one should not “go gentle into that good night.” We see value in the act when you 
“rage, rage against the dying of the light.” 
Part of the rationale for why such “resistance” is valuable may trade on the thought that 
one ought not to give up or resign oneself to failure. This may in fact color our intuition that 
Fran may fight back. We might think that she can’t know that defensive force will not work. 
She should still try to stop Eric. It might work! Still, as a parent who has sat through too many 
children’s sporting events, sometimes one team knows they are going to lose and we still see the 
value in fighting until the end. 
In thinking about the value in this “resistance,” we can also gain some insight by looking 
at its converse—not fighting back. Both Herman and Frowe use the term—complicit—to denote 
one’s role in the injury to oneself if one does not fight back. In some ways, this is a staggering 
accusation. Someone hurts me and if I don’t fight back, I am part of the problem! I’m hurting 
myself! This claim is conceptually and normatively unattractive.  Conceptually, we tend to think 
of complicity as requiring purpose (not even knowledge will do) and it is certainly not my aim to 
be hurt. Normatively, it seems to add insult to injury to say that someone who is being attacked 
is also required to fight against that attack, lest she be dishonoring herself. There are good 
reasons why the law of rape has moved away from the requirement of resistance to the utmost by 
the victim to an understanding that women—some of whom suffer frozen fright—are just as 
violated when they don’t fight back. 
Although I think that we should not place a duty on the victim to resist, I think we can 
still grant significance to the attitude expressed when one does resist. One’s behavior just is a 
reassertion of oneself and one’s value. One is not required to do this, but we might still 
understand that one is saying this by one’s actions. There is an expressive meaning that is 
communicated by this act in reasserting one’s value in the face of attack. 
12 
This way of thinking about honor raises four questions.  First, how does the aggressor 
become “liable” to this expression of honor? Second, does this conception apply in Lucky 
Escape? Third, how does it relate to necessity? Fourth, how does it survive the deferred 
harming objection? 
4. Liability and expressing honor
In some ways it seems obvious that one who fights back expresses or defends one’s 
honor against one’s attacker. I don’t doubt that this is true. At this point, I wish only to express 
the concern that we may need to avail ourselves of additional explanatory resources to articulate 
why it is that Fran gets to harm Eric as a way of saying, “I respect myself and you ought to 
respect me.” Although I will turn to the necessity question momentarily, for now, the question 
on the table is simply why it is that the attacker must absorb a harm, a harm which is expressing 
something. That is, we are asking whether Eric has forfeited a right against this sort of harming 
where the justification for the harming is grounded neither in desert nor defense. 
It may be that we get to say that when one violates another’s rights and does so culpably, 
thereby manifesting disrespect, one cannot complain when the rejection of that message is 
accomplished by force in reply. The alternative would be to say that actors do not forfeit rights 
against expressions of honor. Rather, like deterrence, expressive reasons can only serve to 
justify harms that the agent does not have a right against. Just as we may offer a deterrence 
justification for punishing culpable actors, but not innocent ones, because the former have 
forfeited rights that the latter have not, perhaps we may further expressive values when the actor 
already has forfeited rights on other grounds. 
5. Lucky Escape and the embedded alternative conception of honor
Lucky Escape raises a question that has often debated in criminal law theory and self- 
defense, and this is the duty to retreat. Retreat has long been understood to be part of the 
necessity calculation. Indeed, Larry Alexander has noted that criminal codes that do not require 
retreat but do require that defenders use force only when necessary are internally inconsistent.17 
17 Larry Alexander,’ A Unified Excuse of Preemptive Self-Protection’, Notre Dame Law Review 74 (1999), pp. 1475- 
1505. 
13 
The right to stand one’s ground, and not surrender a position that she lawfully holds, exists and 
may be protected. But it must be protected proportionately. If the defender knows that she can 
kill the aggressor to prevent herself from being killed or that she can step on the aggressor’s 
instep to prevent herself from being killed but the latter increases the probability that she will 
break a heel, then the defender may not kill because one cannot kill someone to protect a shoe.18 
Similarly, we might grant that there is an autonomy interest at work in Lucky Escape—and thus 
in some sense an “honor” interest—allows the use of some force.  Asking someone to jump off a 
cliff—even with a parachute—is a lot to ask! And even if Victim could simply hide behind a 
bush, you are asking him to yield a spot he lawfully occupies because another has threatened 
him.19 
The intersection of retreat and honor is contentious. I want to be clear that the way that 
honor is initially employed by Statman, and the way that it intersects Rape, is different than the 
way that honor is implicated in retreat cases. In retreat cases, the question is whether Victim 
must run away20 or whether he may stay and fight. This second sense of honor shifts our 
discussion from the fierceness of Fran, our resilient rape victim, to the thought of testosterone- 
filled, chest-beating contorted conceptions of masculinity. That said, it seems the distinction that 
many jurisdictions in the United States adopt is the correct one. One may use nondeadly force 
without retreating but may not use deadly force. The idea behind not requiring retreat in 
nondeadly situations is that retreating allows aggressors to violate our rights by forcing us by 
their wrongdoing to surrender where we may otherwise rightfully be and that retreating 
encourages further aggression. We need not be indignant about our dignity to see these as 
appropriate concerns. 
This notion of defending honor—as defending one’s right to remain where one lawfully 
stands—exists independently of the notion that the Murderer is dishonoring the Victim by 
attacking him. Here, Victim is clearly defending his rightful space, and this is an interest that is 
18 See Seth Lazar, ‘Necessity in Self-Defense and War,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs 40 (2012), pp. 3-44. 
19 Quong has argued that to use someone’s space is to use him as a means. Jonathan Quong, ‘Killing in Self- 
Defense,’ Ethics 119 (2009), pp. 507-537. I criticize this position in Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, 'Self-Defense, 
Permissions, and the Means Principle: A Reply to Quong,' Ohio Journal of Criminal Law 8 (2011), pp. 503-513. 
20 I highly recommend that you think of the minstrels in Monty Python’s The Holy Grail singing “Sir Robin ran away, 
away…” 
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properly taken into account in what Victim may defend in Lucky Escape.21 In contrast, I suspect 
that the expressive value in “not giving up” in the face of defeat has no purchase in Lucky 
Escape. To be sure, we have intuitions that the Victim is standing his ground in Lucky Escape, 
but it seems that the value of expression in the face of certain loss simply does not obtain when 
the Victim will lose nothing (or what little he will lose is better explained by a different 
conception). There seems to be less poetic expression in shooting Murderer needlessly. One 
might think that it is, well, dishonorable. It does not seem that even a wrist breaking is in order. 
Hence, we might think that either (1) Murderer simply is not liable to any harm beyond what 
Victim needs to stand his ground and/or (2) harming in this situation fails to express one’s honor. 
6. Honor and necessity
Another problem for any notion of honor is whether it actually solves the necessity 
problem or simply relocates it. Has Frowe, to use one of her favorite locutions, simply moved 
the bump in the carpet? I think it depends on whether we have our finger on the correct framing 
of what the defender is doing. To the extent that this is about defending honor as one would 
defend against a physical threat, it does not seem that the case has been made that harm is 
necessary. That is, if injurying Eric is sufficient to defend dignity, we might still wonder if it is 
necessary. Fran could say, “You are raping me. I am not just a means to your end.” She could 
sing a few bars of Whitney Houston’s The Greatest Love of All, “No matter what they take from 
me. They can’t take away from dignity.” If she really wanted Eric to suffer, she might voice 
activate her iPhone to play Mel Gibson in Braveheart shouting that “They can take our lives. 
But they can’t take our freedom.” Why would physical harm be necessary to reassert herself as 
an end in herself? Hence, even if Eric is liable to moderate harm as a matter of proportionality, 
the necessity problem simply reasserts itself at the level of honor. 
On the other hand, if fighting back is valuable because of the meaning of a tenacious 
fight, then perhaps only some actions will do.22 Because blowing a raspberry just lacks the same 
expressive function as breaking a wrist, we resolve the necessity quandary because the action 
21 Cf. Heidi M. Hurd, ‘Stand Your Ground’, in Michael Weber and Christian Coons, (eds.), The Ethics of Self-Defense 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming) (arguing that one need never retreat). 
22 I thank Gideon Rosen for helpful discussion. 
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reasserts honor as an end in itself, such that more assertion just is more meaning just is more 
honor. The necessity objection may then dissolve. 
7. Deferred harming reprised
Finally, let us consider deferred harming.23 Even assuming we are talking about 
otherwise futile defense cases, and even assuming that violence does assist in allowing the victim 
to assert her honor, we must ask whether this conception rules out deferred harming. After all, 
we have shifted from a notion of averting a threat to a notion of expressing one’s honor. But 
why does that communication have to be contemporaneous with the attack? In the television 
show, The Newsroom, a woman’s ex-boyfriend posts revenge porn on the internet. After he does 
this and she is humiliated, she goes to his office, knees him in the groin, and punches him in the 
face. Why would this action assert her honor if it is done while he is pushing send, but not 
thereafter? Once the value is in the expression—and not in the prevention of dishonoring—the 
requirement that the expression be contemporaneous seems ad hoc. 
For the very reasons I suggested with respect to punitive reasons, I think that we should 
simply embrace the thought that these reasons do remain in force even after the attack is over. 
The fact that victims are required to stay their hands is simply a result of a political morality that 
requires victims to yield to the state. In the absence of the state, do we really think that Fran fails 
to express her honor if she breaks Eric’s wrist the next week? I doubt it. 
8. Is Rape special?
One final question we should ask is whether Rape, which involves rape, contaminates 
our intuitions. Maybe, outside of Rape, where there is a poignant physical struggle, a struggle 
that so clearly borders on being defensive, we may simply reject that there is any expressive 
value.24 To test this, we need a case where the defender is not involved in a physical, quasi- 
defensive struggle. 
23 I thank Victor Tadros for suggesting that this problem has not been solved by Frowe. 
24 I owe this objection to Victor Tadros. 
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Poison. Kelly has surreptitiously given Victoria a slow acting poison. As the poison 
begins to take effect, Kelly announces this to Victoria. Victoria can break Kelly’s wrist 
before she dies. 
Poison should present a strong challenge to both punitive reasons and honor expression. 
Victoria is done for. Nothing she can do will stop it from being the case that Kelly has killed 
her. Do we still think that Victoria may break Kelly’s wrist? 
For those who adopt punitive reasons, it seems Victoria may. After all, harming Kelly 
may have deterrence value. And, Kelly deserves punishment. (If you imagine that otherwise 
Kelly will not be caught and will otherwise get away with murder, I suspect retributive intuitions 
become even stronger, indicating that it is the role of the state, and the possibility of punishment, 
that dampens intuitions here.) 
Imagine that as Victoria is dying, Kelly is taunting her, explaining how she planned the 
murder, how she will marry Victoria’s boyfriend, and so forth. Given that Eric is manifesting 
substantial disrespect in raping Fran, we will need to embellish our case to approximate the 
culpable disrespect involved here. Although I suspect that it is hard to distinguish expressive 
value that could be seen as punishment that vindicates the value of the victim from simply an 
assertion of the value of the victim, still, the permissibility of Victoria’s reassertion of her value 
in the face of her inevitable death at Kelly’s hands seems plausible to me. That is, I do not take 
Rape to present an exceptional case. Nevertheless, to retributivists who think that people who 
culpable harm others deserve punishment, it is perhaps difficult which reason does the intuitive 
work. (And to the extent that honor may only be defended when the aggressor is culpable, it is 
impossible to isolate the reasons.) 
Where are we? The claim that one’s use of force in futile defense cases constitutes a 
defense of honor is an easy argument to make. However, to examine honor carefully, we must 
assess the different strands to see how they connect. What attacks honor? Is honor defended or 
asserted? Why is the aggressor liable? Why is force necessary? May the harming be deferred? 
I do not expect that my brief survey of these questions has yielded definitive answers. I 
do hope, however, to have advanced the inquiry such that when a theorist argues that defending 
honor is a solution to the futile defense problem, the theorist will take pains to explain exactly 
and precisely how honor is defended. I want to turn, however, to another puzzle that lurks 
17 
beneath the surface of the honor defense, and this is the relationship between liability, intention, 
and reasons. 
IV. Reasons, Reasons, Everywhere…But What Is Fran Thinking????
At this point, we should recognize that myriad reasons may justify Fran’s conduct. 
Harming Eric may be justified as a matter of desert, as a matter of deterrence, and as a matter of 
expressing her moral worth. And, perhaps all three of these reasons extend temporally beyond 
the rape itself. Similarly, in Lucky Escape some harm is due and owing to Murderer as a matter 
of desert, deterrence, defense of honor in standing one’s ground, and perhaps defense of honor in 
other senses. I want to suggest the way that we should put these pieces together, a way that 
would be congenial to Frowe’s positions and would offer a new challenge to punitive reasons. 
Let’s consider Eric. Is Eric liable to defensive force? Frowe and I would both answer 
affirmatively though I would say that Eric is only liable to force that Fran believes is defensively 
required (this will matter for Lucky Escape later). Let’s assume Fran intends to defend herself. 
But her breaking his wrist is futile. How should we understand this case? 
I think the appropriate analysis of the situation is that Eric is liable but that the harm can’t 
be all-things-considered permissible unless it is supported by reasons. Although I cannot argue 
for the position here, I take reasons to be fact-relative. Mistakes are not reasons, even when 
reasonably held. Because I am not inclined to go evidence-relative about necessity, I would say 
there is no defensive reason here. An omniscient actor would say there is no defensive reason for 
Fran to act. 
But enter Frowe’s expression of honor. To the extent that the harming has intrinsic 
value, and Eric is not wronged recall, that harming is supported by reasons. 
What about punitive reasons? Well, Frowe is going to have to concede that defenders 
deter aggression by fighting back.  Whether this one does will depend on the actual facts.  (Eric 
is already liable to harm on Frowe’s account. The question is whether there are reasons to give 
him the harm to which he is liable.) 
When we reach retributive reasons, I think we have a problem. Are these reasons 
available to Fran? Ordinarily, we don’t think that one is punishing if one does not act with a 
punitive intention. Assume that Albert and Bob dislike Carl and decide they would like to beat 
him up. Unbeknowst to them, Carl is a rapist who has not been caught and punished. When 
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Albert and Bob beat up Carl, unaware of the desert-based reason that obtains, are they punishing 
him?25 
Notably, Fran has a good intention unlike Albert and Bob, but it is still odd to think that 
this counts as punishment. Unlike the deferred harming objection, then, this one might have 
teeth. 
Let me explain. Eric has forfeited rights against being injured defensively. I suspect that 
Fran believes she is acting defensively. Eric cannot complain about these injuries because he 
forfeited rights against them. However, just because an action will not wrong someone does not 
mean that it is necessarily permissible. If, all things considered, there are not actual reasons that 
support Fran’s actions, then she should not harm him. 
Think of it this way. Assume that Eric was pointing an unloaded gun at Fran, but Fran 
thought it was loaded. Fran might not wrong Eric by shooting him, but objectively, she kills 
someone she did not need to kill. The same question would then arise. If she doesn’t need to kill 
him defensively, are there still reasons that support (perhaps only partially) Fran’s harming Eric? 
In either case, Fran could try to point to deterrence, desert, or maybe expressive value. 
But then, what if she isn’t thinking of those reasons? Surely, deterrence still goes through 
because injurying Eric counts as deterrence if it deters, not depending on what Fran thinks. But 
does desert work the same way? Returning to the wrist breaking, can Fran’s conduct be 
supported by the fact that Eric deserves (more than) a broken wrist if Fran isn’t thinking, “You 
deserve this scumbag!” and is instead thinking, “Get the XXX off of me!”? We might be 
tempted to think yes, but this is a bit of moral slippage, in taking one justifying reason that 
usually requires that that justification be the intended (or known) goal and substituting it for the 
actual motivating reason which would have been justifying had the facts been as the actor 
believed them. 
Of course, this question extends beyond punishment. We might likewise ask whether 
expressing honor likewise requires an intention. Culpability doesn’t – the aggressor manifests 
disrespect without needing to intend to manifest disrespect. But we do need to be clearer about 
exactly what expressing honor, because some conceptions might make this reason unavailable to 
Fran unless she acts with the express intention. 
25 Cf. Christopher Heath Wellman, ‘The Rights Forfeiture Theory of Punishment’, Ethics 122 (2012), pp. 371-393. 
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To summarize the worry, then, Rape looks like a case where Fran intends to act 
defensively, but she’s mistaken. Theorists are quick to offer alternative accounts of the deep- 
seated intuition that Fran may act despite the fact that defensive force is futile. They offer other 
reasons, reasons that do obtain, to justify the harm. My concern is that not all of these reasons 
are reasons that have force merely by existing. Rather, sometimes these reasons need to be 
intended or known before they are available. This may mean that the quest to justify Fran’s 
conduct is somewhat more complicated than it first appears.26 
V. Counter-Defense
My final question is whether we should be on board with Frowe’s approach to Lucky 
Escape. Frowe takes a somewhat peculiar path in Lucky Escape that ought to be more carefully 
parsed. One result that Frowe thinks we ought to reach is that Murderer cannot kill Victim in 
Lucky Escape. However, Frowe does think that Murderer can fight back against disproportionate 
force. I believe that this conclusion is incorrect on the terms of Frowe’s own argument. 
Moreover, I worry that Frowe’s cabining of her inquiry (ignoring other resources that might 
explain some of these situations) blocks from view a better explanation of the moral landscape. 
Frowe argues that Murderer is liable in Lucky Escape, arguing for what she calls 
“externalism” about necessity. Though I agree with Frowe that the necessity limitation is not 
best seen as an internal limit on liability, I wonder whether the internalism/externalism debate is 
the most perspicuous way to see this. Ultimately, the question is whether liability requires not 
just forfeiture but a reason (understood objectively) for engaging in the conduct. The 
relationship between liability and reasons is underexamined. One could thereby contrast Tadros’ 
duty approach, where one has an obligation to engage in the action, with McMahan’s approach, 
where one must have an instrumental defensive reason, with my approach that liability ought to 
include only forfeiture.27 On my view, once there is forfeiture, then, the question is how the fact 
26 One final complication is that many self-defense theorists (myself included) believe that actors are only liable to 
those who act defensively, intending or knowing they are so doing. But then the requirements for liability seem to 
hold that the actor is only liable to defensive force, not force that is justified by other reasons. For a fuller 
explanation, see Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, ‘Defensive Force without Defensive Reason’, (manuscript on file with 
author). 
27 Compare Victor Tadros, ‘Duty and Liability’, Utilitas 24 (2012), pp. 259-277 (defining liability broadly to include 
duties that are not grounded in moral responsibility) with Jeff McMahan, ‘Individual Liability in War: A Response 
to Fabre, Leveringhaus and Tadros,’Utilitas 24 (2012), pp. 278-299 (arguing that liability should be limited to 
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that the defender’s conduct will not constitute a rights violation links to the determination of all- 
things-considered permissibility. Necessity then serves as a limit to the extent that we think that 
the interests of culpable aggressors remain, even if their rights not to be harmed do not. Frowe’s 
“proportionate means externalism” is thus better expressed as a claim about rights forfeiture 
(liability) and a recognition that harming, and the extent of harming, must be supported by 
reasons (“proportionate means”). 
With Lucky Escape, killing Murderer is not supported by reasons. Although I share 
Frowe’s “externalism,” I part company with Frowe in thinking that internalists lack the resources 
to explain why Murderer cannot fight back. As I’ve argued previously, individuals who start 
fights may lose defensive rights despite the fact that the responder still wrongs the provocateur 
by injuring him.28 We can maintain that Murderer started it and so cannot defend while 
simultaneously judging Victim’s actions to be impermissible. Given that this is the widespread 
position across states and therefore arguably represents the considered judgment of a large 
populace, it strikes me that philosophers would be wise to devote at least a paragraph to 
considering whether there is any wisdom to the approach. 
Irrespective of whether Frowe finds the provocateur explanation to be plausible, there 
remains the problem that Frowe’s analysis fails on its own terms. She maintains that Murderer is 
liable to be killed, but such a killing is not all-things-considered permissible. But to Frowe that 
is not the end of the matter because Murderer is liable to some force as a matter of Victim 
defending his honor. So, some harming is permissible, and the Murderer cannot defend against 
that. But what if Victim goes overboard and uses more force than is justified to defend his 
honor? Frowe then maintains that Murderer can defend himself. “He may therefore use force to 
defend himself only against the excess harm that exceeds what victim may inflict in defending 
his honour.” (118). Murderer therefore has a “limited right of counter-defence.” (118). 
I find this result curious. The root of the trouble, I think, is that using internalism and 
externalism obscures the relationship between liability and reasons. 
Consider an examples of the relationship between rights and reasons. My neighbor wants 
to access the street behind my house by walking on my grass. Begrudgingly, I consent. Now, if 
forfeiture so as not to conflate different moral notions). See also Jeff McMahan, ‘The Limits of Self-Defense’, in 
Michael Weber and Christian Coons, (eds.), The Ethics of Self-Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
forthcoming) (arguing liability is instrumental). 
28 Ferzan, ‘Provocateurs’. 
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my neighbor has another way to access the street that does not trample my grass, then that is the 
way that he ought to go. But am I entitled to push him off my grass to enforce this lesser-evil? 
Or having waived my right am I prevented from any further enforcement of the very same 
interest at stake? The question is what to make of an interest that is not protected by a right 
when harming that interest is still all-things-considered impermissible.29 
The Murderer’s interest is not protected by a right. He gave it up by attacking. On 
Frowe’s view, Murderer is liable to deadly force. The reason why deadly force may not be used 
is because although the Murderer is liable, it is not all-things-considered permissible and this is 
because reasons only support using force that is necessary. But the question is whether interests 
that are not protected by rights – because those rights have been forfeited or waived—may be 
asserted as interests by the very agents who forfeited or waived their interests. I would think that 
a comprehensive view of what it means to forfeit or waive a right includes the inability to assert 
the interest that was protected by that right.30 My allowance of my neighbor’s walking across 
my grass prevents me from stopping him or complaining about the harm to my interests even if 
all-things-considered he ought not to walk across my grass. It is then an interesting question 
(and one I cannot pursue) whether third parties may intervene to prevent harm to such interests. 
Because I adopt intention internalism, that is I require the defender to believe her action 
is necessary to defend against the harm irrespective of whether it is, I would deny that Murderer 
is liable to deadly force because I find it hard to believe that Victim himself believes that his 
action is defensive. Instead, the question for me would then be whether Murderer provoked the 
use of deadly force such that he forfeits his defensive rights. On my view, Murderer is wronged 
by Victim’s use of unnecessary force but cannot defend against it. On Frowe’s view, Murderer 
is not wronged by Victim’s use of unnecessary force but may nevertheless defend against it on 
lesser evils principles. Even if she chooses to reject a provocateur principle, Frowe’s view that 
Murderer is liable should require that Murderer stay his hand, even if the force is ultimately 
impermissible. 
****** 
The necessity limitation stands at the crossroads of forfeiture and all-things-considered 
permissibility. We must know its role in determining whether the aggressor has forfeited and its 
29 I thank Adil Haque for general discussion of this question. 
30 Hence, the idea that consent is in some sense the waiver of one’s right of complaint. 
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role in supporting reasons to use force against those who have forfeited or waived their rights. 
Our quest to find reasons that might support Fran’s use of force is only the first step in a larger 
inquiry. 
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